Neuroimaging studies with positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have begun to describe the functional neuroanatomy of emotion. Taken separately, specific studies vary in task dimensions and in type(s) of emotion studied and are limited by statistical power and sensitivity. By examining findings across studies, we sought to determine if common or segregated patterns of activations exist across various emotional tasks. We reviewed 55 PET and fMRI activation studies (yielding 761 individual peaks) which investigated emotion in healthy subjects. Peak activation coordinates were transformed into a standard space and plotted onto canonical 3-D brain renderings. We divided the brain into 20 nonoverlapping regions, and characterized each region by its responsiveness across individual emotions (positive, negative, happiness, fear, anger, sadness, disgust), to different induction methods (visual, auditory, recall/imagery), and in emotional tasks with and without cognitive demand. Our review yielded the following summary observations: (1) The medial prefrontal cortex had a general role in emotional processing; (2) 
INTRODUCTION
It has long been proposed that emotion involves the limbic system (Papez, 1937; MacLean, 1952; LeDoux, 1996) . Recently, this assumption has been tested with functional neuroimaging techniques such as positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). These studies have reported emotion-related increases in cerebral blood flow or BOLD signal (activations) in cortical, limbic, and paralimbic regions. Many authors have hypothesized that specific brain regions have specialized functions for emotional operations. For example, while some postulated that the amygdala is critical to fear-related processing (LeDoux, 2000) , others have suggested that amygdala activations correspond to dispositional affective style (Irwin and Davidson, 1999) . The medial prefrontal cortex has been hypothesized to have specific roles for emotional decision making (Damasio, 1996) and emotional self-regulation (Davidson, 2000) , while the orbital prefrontal cortex is considered important for the evaluation of emotion-related reinforcement contingencies (Rolls, 1999) . The retrosplenial cortex has been proposed as important in processing emotionally salient stimuli, particularly in the interaction between emotion and episodic memory (Maddock, 1999) . In spite of general agreement about some of these specialized emotional regions, conflicting findings are often produced by studies using different induction methods and imaging techniques.
Taken separately, individual imaging studies cannot fully characterize which brain regions are responsible for emotion due to low statistical power and heterogeneity in task design, imaging methods, and analysis. These variations have made it difficult to interpret the differences in activation patterns found. Under this circumstance, a broader-based meta-analysis of multiple studies may be one solution (Fox et al., 1998) . By examining findings across studies, patterns of activations can be evaluated across similar and dissimilar emotional tasks. This meta-analysis examines findings across imaging studies in search of specific regions associated with emotional activation in general, with specific emotions and different induction methods. We also examined if there are brain regions associated with emotional activation tasks that had a cognitive component (e.g., emotional expression recognition, gender discrimination, etc.). Particularly, we examined how "sensitive" specific brain regions were to different emotional tasks (reflected by the percentage of studies reporting activation in a region according to a condition of interest). We also examined how "specific" certain brain regions were for different emotional responses (reflected by the frequency of activation in a specific region with a given task in comparison to other regions). The effect of gender and valence (the extent to which emotion is unpleasant or pleasant) on activation patterns, and the question of laterality in activation patterns are major topics in neuroimaging of emotion, and thus require an extensive and separate discussion. Therefore, we have chosen to report these results separately (Wager et al., in preparation) .
METHODS

Scope of Review
In order to illuminate both general and specific patterns of activation associated with different emotional tasks, we searched peer-reviewed journals (indexed in large databases [MEDLINE, PsychInfo, BrainMap] ) for English-language manuscripts of PET and fMRI emotion induction studies published between January, 1990, and December, 2000 . To allow us to performed planned meta-analysis, all reports included met the following criteria: (1) They involved unmedicated healthy adults; (2) They focused on higher-order mental processes of emotion (thus, studies of lower-order sensory or motor processes, such as gustatory/olfactory or pain induction, were excluded) [see reviews by by Small et al., 1999; Casey et al., 1994, respectively] ; (3) They all measured regional cerebral blood flow (e.g., O 15 H 2 O-PET) or blood oxygenation (e.g., BOLD-fMRI) across the entire brain (i.e., excluding studies that focused on limited regions of the brain); (4) They all used the image subtraction methodology to determine activation foci; (5) They provided standard Talairach (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988) or Montreal Neurologic Institute (MNI) coordinates, allowing for comparison of findings across different studies and different laboratories. We chose not to include studies on aversive and trace conditioning (Bü chel et al., 1998; Morris et al., 1998b; LaBar et al., 1998; Bü chel et al., 1999) because those tasks involve associative learning and behavioral conditioning (including acquisition and extinction), rendering them incomparable to the emotional tasks in our database. Furthermore, these fearconditioning related activations were extensively discussed in a recent review by Bü chel and . Only activation peaks were examined in this meta-analysis. The reporting of deactivation or decreases in brain activity was not consistent across studies which did not allow meaningful generalization. Also, the neural mechanisms underlying reported deactivations remain undetermined and their interpretations remain inconclusive or unclear (Hutchinson et al., 1999; Raichle et al., 2001) .
Organization of Results
Fifty-five publications/studies (43 PET and 12 fMRI) spanning from May, 1993 , to December, 2000 , that met our database criteria, yielding 119 subtractions/contrasts and 761 individual activation peaks, were included for meta-analysis (Table 1) . Because the studies adopted different analysis methods and significance criteria, all foci were accepted when reported as significant by the criteria designated in the individual studies.
The activation results are grouped in the following manner: (1) Regions associated with Individual Emotion (fear, sadness, disgust, anger, happiness); (2) regions associated with Induction Method (visual, auditory, autobiographical recall/imagery); and (3) regions associated with presence and absence of Cognitive Demand. Table 1 lists all studies included in the review, arranged alphabetically, and identifies the Individual Emotion examined and the Induction Method employed. We examined the effect of Cognitive Demand, as a separate but related component of Induction Method, for a variety of reasons. Neuroimaging literature often distinguishes between cognitive and emotional tasks, but the majority of the emotional tasks contain various degrees of cognitive demand. Furthermore, there is a clear interaction between emotion and cognition on a functional level. To examine the neuroanatomic basis of this interaction, we examined the effect of these cognitive components in emotion activation by grouping conditions in which an emotional task was coupled with a concurrent cognitive task (e.g., gender/emotional expression discrimination, emotional rating, picture/face recognition/encoding, naming, counting, autobiographical recall/imagery, etc.) as Emotion ϩ Cognition or with Cognitive Demand. Conversely, we grouped conditions in which the emotional task did not explicitly have a cognitive component (i.e., passive viewing, passive listening) as Emotion alone or without Cognitive Demand. This classification allows us to examine the effect of a "nonemotional" cognitive component on emotional tasks.
The standard coordinates of activation peaks reported by individual studies were plotted onto lateral and medial views of a 3-D canonical brain image (SPM 96, Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London; derived from the MNI brain template). Figures  1A-1C show the result of grouping plotted activa- For a semiquantitative analysis, we divided the atlas brain into 20 general regions, and examined whether activations in each specific region was associated with different Individual Emotion, Induction Method, and Cognitive Demand. Each study included in this review identified the location of the activation peak as anatomical structure/gyrus and/or Brodmann area. We used this information to localize the activation peaks in the 20 brain regions used in this review. The number of activation peaks reported for a single region differed according to each study's chosen statistical threshold and analysis methods. Therefore, we considered a region as activated for a particular study if one or more activation peak in this region was reported. This approach was chosen to counterbalance the tendency for overestimating activations based on variable thresholds used in different studies, and allowed us to estimate the percentage of studies that reported an activation foci in a specific region in response to each Individual Emotion, Induction Method, and Cognitive Demand ( Figs. 2A-2C ).
Additionally, we examined how specific the reported regional activations were to Individual Emotion, Induction Method, and Cognitive Demand. For all studies that employed similar contrasts and methods, we compared the number of studies that found activation in a particular region to those that did not using chisquare (X 2 ) analysis. The results of the X 2 analysis are presented in Fig. 2 .
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Regions Involved Across Individual Emotions
1.1. General emotional processing and the medial prefrontal cortex. No specific brain region was consistently activated in the majority of studies, across individual emotions and induction methods, suggesting that no single brain region is commonly activated by all emotional tasks. Although no region was activated in over 50% of all studies, we did find that the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) was commonly activated, and that its activation was not specific to a specific emotion or induction method (see Figs. 2A and 2B) . While there may not be a particular brain region that is absolutely necessary for all emotional functions, the common activation of the MPFC may reflect that certain aspects may be shared across different emotional tasks. Figure 2A shows that the MPFC was activated across multiple individual emotions (four of five specific emotions in at least 40% of studies). Accordingly, X 2 analysis revealed no specific association between the MPFC and Individual Emotion as compared to other regions. These findings suggest that the MPFC may have a general role in emotional processing, as suggested by Lane, Reiman, and colleagues, who reported that emotional films, pictures, and recall as wells as positive and negative emotion, happiness, sadness, disgust, and the mixture of these emotions all separately engaged the MPFC (Lane et al., 1997a; Lane et al., 1997c; Reiman et al., 1997) . This is consistent with the notion that a number of processes are potentially common to various emotional tasks (e.g., appraisal/evaluation of emotion, emotional regulation, and emotion-driven decision-making). Lane et al. (1997b) did find that the MPFC (BA9) activated when subjects internally-attended to their emotional state, but not when they externally attended to nonaffective characteristics of a picture stimulus. Furthermore, activity in the MPFC has been shown to correlate with emotional awareness to both film and recall-generated emotion, suggesting its role in detecting emotional signals from both exteroceptive and interoceptive cues (Lane et al., 1998) . One possibility therefore is that the MPFC may be involved in the cognitive aspects (e.g., attention to emotion, appraisal/identification of emotion) of emotional processing (Drevets and Raichle, 1998) .
Given the putative importance of cognition in emotion, we questioned whether the MPFC can be subdivided into affective and cognitive regions, which has been observed in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Bush et al., 2000) . The ACC is known to be involved in a form of attention that serves to regulate both cognitive and emotional processing (Whalen et al., 1998a; Bush et al., 2000) , and is closely interconnected to the MPFC (Petrides and Pandya, 1999; Devinsky et al., 1995) . Figures 1A and 1B show that activations reported in the prefrontal cortex in response to different Individual Emotions and Induction Methods are located within ventral-rostral BA 9 and 10 of MPFC, and extend into the affective division of rostral anterior cingulate cortex (ACCad) (BA rostral 24, anterior/ventral 32, 33) . While the activations located in the area of the MPFC are more ventral and less dorsal, we did not find any evidence for a functional affective-cognitive division of the MPFC. Our Cognitive Demand analysis revealed that relatively much fewer Emotion alone peaks fell into dorsal MPFC (see Fig. 1C ), in comparison to studies with tasks that involved Emotion and Cognition. Thus, MPFC appears equally sensitive to both emotional tasks with and without Cognitive Demand, as activations from both conditions cluster in ventral MPFC (see Figs. 1C and 2C) . Interestingly, previous meta-analyses of cognition revealed that the rostral-ventral and orbital regions of the MPFC are largely insensitive to cognitive tasks (Duncan and Owen, 2000; Cabeza and Nyberg, 2000) .
Regions Associated with Individual Emotions
2.1 Fear and the amygdala. Specifically, fear induction had a strong association with the amygdala. Sixty percent of studies that examined fear activated the amygdala (X 2 ϭ 12.57, P ϭ 0.01) ( Fig. 2A ). Several lines of evidence support the notion that the amygdala is responsible for detecting, generating, and maintaining fear-related emotions. Particularly, the amygdala has been implicated in the recognition of fearful facial expressions Calder et al., 1996) , feelings of fear after procaine induction (Ketter et al., 1996) , fear conditioning (LeDoux, 1993; Bechara et al., 1995; LaBar et al., 1995; Morris et al., 1998b; Whalen et al., 1998b) , and in evocation of fearful emotional responses from direct stimulation (Halgren et al., 1978) .
The amygdala also appears important in the detection of environment threat (Scott et al., 1997; Isenberg et al., 1999; Phillips et al., 1998a) , as well as in the coordination of appropriate responses to threat and danger (Kluber and Bucy, 1939; Weiskrantz, 1956; King, 1992) . Strikingly, of the eight studies that examined cerebral responses to fearful faces, six pointed to the critical involvement of the amygdala (Morris et al., 1996; Breiter et al., 1996; Phillips et al., 1997; Phillips et al., 1998a; Morris et al., 1998a; Whalen et al., 1998a) . Fear-associated amygdalar activations also extended into other modalities such as words (Isenberg et al., 1999) and vocalizations (Phillips 1998a) . Morris et al. (1996) found that the amygdalar response to fearful faces showed a significant interaction with the intensity of emotion (increasing with increasing fearfulness) and that the activation was not contingent upon the explicit processing of facial expression, as subjects were instructed to classify emotional faces by gender not by emotion. Such an interpretation is further strengthened by findings from studies using masked fearful faces which found that the amygdalar response occurred even when the fearful expression was not consciously perceived or even when subjects did not experience fear subjectively (Morris et al., 1998b; Whalen et al., 1998a) .
Given that fear is the most salient of the individual emotions, an alternative interpretation for the amygdala's involvement is that it has a more general role for vigilance or for processing salience, or attributes that make stimuli meaningful (Davis and Whalen, 2001 ). Whalen et al. (1998b) observed that the amygdala responds to fearful faces despite the lack of explicit rec-ognition of the expression and that fearful faces are more likely to signify a signal for threat than to induce fear given that subjects often do not report being afraid. Hence, the amygdalar activations may be primarily for processing affective information in service of imparting danger warnings. Amygdala activations occur throughout various evocative stimuli, including fear faces (Morris et al., 1996; Breiter et al., 1996; Phillips et al., 1997) , aversive pictures (Irwin et al., 1996; Taylor et al., 1998; Simpson et al., 2000) , as well as sad (Blair et al., 1999) and happy faces (Breiter et al., 1996) , and positive pictures (Hamann et al., 1999) . A positive correlation of blood flow in the amygdala was found with subsequent recall of pleasant pictures (Hamann et al., 1999) : in that study, the amygdala activated to both pleasant and unpleasant pictures. Thus, the amygdala may not exclusively respond to affectively laden stimuli, but may respond to meaningful stimuli in general. Our own findings also concur this interpretation since we have observed that amygdala also responds to nonaversive/neutral and positive (Liberzon et al., submitted) pictures, supporting evidence from animal studies of the structure's role in mediating conditioned responses which enhance information processing to nonaversive stimuli (Everitt, 1991) . These findings suggest that the amygdala responds to emotional importance or stimulus salience, regardless of valence (whether the content is pleasant or aversive/unpleasant). This is also consistent with psychophysiologic evidence of skin conductance response (SCR) to affective pictures which demonstrate a response to salient, arousing stimuli, regardless of emotional valence (Lang et al., 1993) .
2.2 Sadness and the subcallosal cingulate. Sadness induction was significantly associated with subcallosal cingulate cortex (SCC) activation. About 46% of sadness induction studies reported activation of the SCC, region localized to the ventral/subgenual anterior cingulate (BA 25), over twice as frequently as any other specific emotion (X 2 ϭ 9.24, P ϭ 0.05). Interestingly, hypometabolism or hypoperfusion has been found in the SCC in resting state studies of patients with clinical depression, a mood disorder with relatively more sustained sadness (Baxter et al., 1985; Mayberg, 1994; Drevets et al., 1997) . As expected, activity in the subgenual cingulate (BA 25) increased when depressed subjects respond to pharmacologic treatment (Brody et al., 1999; Mayberg et al., 2000) . George et al. (1995) speculated that dysphoria-induced hyperactivity in this area may lead those susceptible towards a compensatory pattern of hypometabolism. Because Reiman and colleagues (1997) found anterior cingulate activity to recall-generated but not film-induced sadness, they interpreted that the SCC activations may result more from the cognitive process of internally generating emotion, and less from sadness itself.
Though this review found that many of the SCC activations arose from studies in which sadness was transiently induced by autobiographical scripts (George et al., 1995; Lane et al., 1997c; Mayberg et al., 1999; Liotti et al., 2000) , the X 2 analysis did not support the notion that SCC activation was specifically associated with recall induction, as compared to other induction methods. The inconsistent findings in earlier activation studies on transient sadness in healthy subjects, particularly in the subgenual ACC (Gemar et al., 1996; Pardo et al., 1993; George et al., 1995) , may be attributed to the differences in provocation method. Particularly, subjects were partly or fully scanned while they were actively generating the targeted emotional state with additional cognitive tasks such as recalling or visualizing emotional memories. Liotti et al. (2000) and Mayberg et al. (1999) attempted to address these perceptual or cognitive confounds by scanning subjects after they had achieved a desired intensity of sadness, and confirmed the activations in subgenual ACC (BA 25).
2.3 Happiness and the basal ganglia. Nearly 70% happiness induction studies reported activation in the basal ganglia (BG) (Fig. 2A) . The notion that this area may be important in positive emotions, such as happiness, gains support from multiple in vivo investigations of addictive substances and behaviors (Breiter et al., 1997; Stein et al., 1998; Koob, 1992; Koch et al., 1996) , reward processing (Rolls, 1999) , and enjoyable (playing a video game) activities (Koepp et al., 1998) . Activations in the basal ganglia, including the ventral striatum and putamen, have been observed in response to happy faces (Whalen et al., 1998a; Morris et al., 1996 Morris et al., , 1998a Phillips et al., 1998b) , pleasant pictures (Lane et al., 1997a; Lane et al., 1999; Davidson and Irwin, 1999) , happiness-induced recall (George et al., 1996b; Damasio et al., 2000) , pleasant sexual and successful competitive arousal Redoute et al., 2000) . Given its rich innervation of mesolimbic dopaminergic neurons, the basal ganglia/ ventral striatum is well positioned to respond to incentive reward motivation and to pregoal attainment of positive affect arising from progression toward a desired goal (Davidson and Irwin, 1999) , consistent with the notion that happiness can be conceptualized as an approach emotion (Davidson et al., 1990) .
2.4 Disgust and the basal ganglia. Interesting, we also found that disgust induction frequently activated the BG; 60% of studies evoking disgust reported engagement of the BG (Fig. 2A) . Contrary to happiness, disgust has been theoretically conceptualized as a withdrawal emotion (Davidson et al., 1990) . The reviewed studies suggest that, particularly, facial expressions of disgust activated the BG (Phillips et al., 1997 (Phillips et al., , 1998a Sprengelmeyer et al., 1998) . Sprengelmeyer and colleagues (1998) hypothesized a specific functional role for the basal ganglia in processing disgust, consistent with observations that patients with Huntington's disease and obsessive-compulsive disorder, who have neuropathology in their basal ganglia, have impairments in recognizing facial expressions of disgust compared to other emotions. The activations seen in the basal ganglia in response to disgust may represent a state of preparedness triggered by a warning stimulus to process emotionally salient information (Sprengelmeyer et al., 1998) . With its known motor functions, the basal ganglia may also serve to coordinate appropriate action responses to stimuli that unpleasant (inducing disgusting), or pleasing (promoting happiness), in nature, and guide the organism towards a desired goal (e.g., to approach or withdraw) (Panksepp, 1998).
Regions Associated with Induction Method
Regions involved in emotion induction with and without cognitive demand.
This meta-analysis found that emotional tasks with cognitive components specifically engaged the ACC as compared to passive emotional conditions (36 vs 12%, respectively; X 2 ϭ 3.52, P ϭ 0.06). Earlier, when discussing the findings of the MPFC activation with both Emotion ϩ Cognition and Emotion alone tasks, we hypothesized that activations seen in the MPFC are driven by the general component of the emotional task (e.g., with little impact by Cognitive Demand), and interpreted that the MPFC may have a general role in emotional processing. We speculated that the MPFC may respond to cognitive aspects that are potentially common across various emotional responses (e.g., attention to emotion, appraisal or interpretation of emotion), which are implicit to the emotional tasks and therefore are present both in the studies with Cognitive Demand and in the studies with Emotion alone. However, based on this analysis, when the cognitive components are explicit to an emotional task (e.g., gender identification, recognition/encoding or rating of emotional stimuli, biographical recall of emotion) rendering these task in the "with Cognitive Demand" category, it appears that the ACC is recruited. Therefore, the ACCad may interact with the MPFC to regulate interconnected cognitive and emotional tasks, depending on whether the cognitive component is implicit or explicit to that emotional response. Together, the rostral ACC and MPFC, with extensive connections to subcortical limbic structures, constitute both the heteromodal association cortex and paralimbic cortex respectively, and therefore comprise a plausible transition and interaction zone between affective and cognitive processing.
The MPFC and ACCad may also have additional emotional modulatory functions from this cognitiveemotion interaction. As noted above, conditions with and without Cognitive Demand equally activate the MPFC, while cognitively-bound emotional tasks specifically engaged ACC. While most Individual Emotions activate both the MPFC and ACC, one exception involves fear, which recruits this region at frequencies fewer than 30% and 20% respectively (see Fig. 2B ). Instead, fear studies engage the amygdala robustly (over 60% frequency; discussed earlier). Additionally, passive emotional conditions without Cognitive Demand (e.g., Emotion alone) activate the amygdala more often than cognitive emotional tasks. Given their putative affective-cognitive functions and reciprocal connections to subcortical limbic structures, the MPFC and ACC could serve as top-down modulators of intense emotional responses, especially those generated by the amygdala. Several lines of evidence support such an interpretation. From animal studies, the amygdala has been shown to be critical in fear conditioning (LeDoux, 1994) . However, one can prolong the extinction of this conditioned fear by ablation of the MPFC (Morgan et al., 1993) . Lesions in the human rostral MPFC also lead to socially inappropriate expressions of emotions and impairments in making advantageous personally relevant decisions (Damasio, 1994) , suggesting a lack of cognitive processing of emotionally "loaded" situations. Furthermore, glucose metabolism in the MPFC is strongly inversely associated with the glucose metabolic rate of the amygdala (Ambercrombie et al., 1996) . Our group has found that activity is the amygdaloid region is attenuated while the MPFC and cingulate sulcus are activated during a cognitive appraisal condition of aversive visual stimuli (versus passive viewing) (Taylor et al., submitted) . Additionally, deactivation of the amygdala has been observed in several tasks that involve higher cognitive processing (Drevets and Raichle, 1998) . One alternative hypothesis of these reciprocal findings is that limbic structures, like the amygdala, are more likely to respond to stimuli that are more "emotive" at a sensory/perceptual level, and are less likely to be engaged by cognitively demanding emotional tasks, or to cognitively elicited emotions (Reiman et al., 1997; Teasdale et al., 1999) .
3.2 Recall induction and the anterior cingulate. Similar to conditions with Cognitive Demand, those which induced emotions by evoking memories or imagery of personally relevant affectively laden events required explicit intensive cognitive effort. Accordingly, the recollection/recall induction of emotion specifically activated the anterior cingulate; 50% of recall induction studies reported ACC activations, versus 31% and 0% of visual and auditory induction studies, respectively (X 2 ϭ 5.96, P ϭ 0.05). As described above, recruitment of the ACC was specific to cognitively demanding emotional tasks, and therefore, this association suggests that recalled emotions are cognitively elicited, as noted by Reiman et al. (1997) and Teasdale et al. (1999) . Given its known cognitive functions including modulation of attention and executive functions, and interconnections with subcortical limbic structures, the ACC's involvement in cognitive induction of emotional response, is not surprising. Such a process demands cognitive effort, as subjects are instructed to recall or imagine an emotionally laden personal event then self-induce or internally generate intense target emotions (Teasdale et al., 1999) . Moreover, the ACC is consistently activated in semantic and episodic memory retrieval tasks (Cabeza and Nyberg, 2000) .
3.3 Recall induction, cognitive demand, and the insula. Nearly 60% of recall induction studies reported activation of the insula, compared to less than 20% of either visual or auditory inductions (X 2 ϭ 8.23, P ϭ 0.02). Like the ACC, recruitment of the insula was also identified more with cognitively demanding emotional tasks (X 2 ϭ 7.71, P ϭ 0.01), than with passive emotional tasks. Lane et al. (1997c) and Reiman et al. (1997) specifically found that emotional recall, but not emotional film viewing, engaged the insula. Our findings as well as earlier studies on non-human primates (Augustine et al., 1996) support the suggestion that the insula is preferentially involved in the evaluative, experiential, or expressive aspects of internally generated emotions (Reiman et al., 1997) . In a study in which multiple specific individual emotions were induced by recall (happiness, sadness, fear, and disgust), Damasio and colleagues (2000) found that all emotions engaged the cingulate, insular cortex, and brainstem. Their findings are consistent with anatomic evidence that these regions are direct and indirect recipients of signals from the internal milieu and viscera, which are important in the regulation of homeostasis. Given this proposed role of emotion in maintaining homeostasis, Damasio et al. (2000) suggest that these regions, while engaged in the recall and self-generation of affect, monitor the ongoing internal emotional state of the organism, and may represent the neural correlates of mental states known as feelings. Reiman et al. (1997) had posited that the insula may participate in the evaluation of "distressing cognitions, interoceptive emotional significance" as an alarm center for internally-sensed dangers or homeostatic changes. Such an internal alarm hypothesis is consistent with our findings that the insula is associated with both self-induced or internally generated recalled emotions and with cognitively demanding tasks.
3.4 Visual induction and the occipital cortex. The occipital/visual cortex (OC) (mainly BA 18 and 19, but also occipital gyrus and fusiform gyrus) was almost exclusively activated by visually evocative stimuli. Of the 35 visual induction studies, 60% reported activation in the OC, which were reported in only 29% and 0% of recall and auditory induction studies, respectively. As a general rule, the studies included in this review controlled for activations driven by simple sensory processing by designing both the target and control conditions to have similar sensory loads (e.g., conditions with emotionally laden visual stimuli were compared with conditions with emotionally neutral visual stimuli). Often, the pictorial stimuli were matched for color, luminance, and complexity across target and control conditions. The visual stimuli that activated OC were diverse and included pleasant and aversive pictures (Kosslyn et al., 1996; Lane et al., 1997a; Lang et al., 1998; Reiman et al., 1997; Taylor et al., 1998 Taylor et al., , 2000 Lane et al., 1999; Paradiso et al., 1999; Simpson et al., 2000; Kalin et al., 1997; Irwin et al., 1997) , emotional faces (Morris et al., 1998a; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1998) , and emotional films (Paradiso et al., 1997; Lane et al., 1997c; Beauregard et al. 1998) . The modulation of the OC by the emotional components of visual induction may have been driven by either (1) from the processing of emotionally loaded content or, (2) from an interaction between visual perception and emotional processing.
Due to its engagement across multiple visual emotion tasks, it has been proposed that the OC mediates and appraises visually relevant, complex emotional stimuli (Lane et al., 1997a; Beauregard et al., 1998) . Reiman and colleagues (1997) suggested that visual association areas in occipitotemporal cortex could be involved in the evaluation procedure of complex visual stimuli with emotional relevance. The activations in the visual cortex were found to be independent of the type of emotions by a number of authors (Kosslyn et al., 1996; Lane et al., 1997; Lang et al., 1998; Reiman et al., 1997) . An alternative interpretation is that the occipital cortex is recruited because the visual stimuli are highly arousing, as such stimuli appears to activated perceptual areas more extensively (Lang et al., 1998; Taylor et al., 2000) . Differences in image complexity, particularly semantic complexity, has been proposed as the underlying mediator of the occipital cortex activations despite experimentally balancing for the content of images for luminance, color, and detail (Irwin et al., 1997; Taylor et al., 2000) . For example, visual cortex activation may also be attributed to differential eye movements between emotional and non-emotional stimuli due to complexity. However, Lang et al. (1998) demonstrated no difference in the duration or magnitude of scanning eye movements between the stimuli, and Lorge et al. (2000; unpublished data) reported that the extent of eye movements did not correlate with occipital cortex responses. Another possible contribution to the activation found in the visual cortex, particularly in the fusiform gyrus, may arise from the presence of faces in the pictorial and film stimuli. However, Simpson et al. (2000) found that the OC activation in their study was related to the emotional valence of the pictures not the presence of faces, and suggested that the presence of faces could not fully explain the visual cortex/fusiform activations. Additional studies specifically examining the effect of image content will be needed to completely rule out potential confounding activations due to visual complexity and/or arousal.
One plausible explanation is that visual processing areas may represent top-down modulatory effects on the visual processing stream, particularly in relation to the amygdala, which was also found to be specific to visual induction. Anatomically, projections from limbic regions like the amygdala extend to all the processing steps in the ventral visual stream, including the primary visual cortex (Amaral et al., 1984) . A component of this top-down processing may be the selective attention that drives the modulation of visual processing (Corbetta et al., 1993) . Anatomical studies has shown that the primate amygdala receives substantial input from temporal visual-association areas (Iwai et al., 1987 , Aggleton et al., 1980 . Both Morris et al. (1998a) and Sprengelmeyer et al. (1998) proposed a neuromodulatory function (top-down processing) of the amygdala on extrastriate cortical regions after finding an inverse correlation of amygdala and fusiform activity in response to fearful faces. Morris et al. (1998) hypothesized that extrastriate regions have functional interactions with the amygdala, evidenced by other facial emotion processing studies (George et al., 1993; Adolphs et al., 1996) . 3.5 Visual induction and the amygdala. The visual induction method also preferentially activated the amygdala, over recall and auditory-generated emotion. Fifty percent of visual induction studies reported activation of the amygdala, compared to 7% and 0% of recall and auditory inductions, respectively (X 2 ϭ 12.93, P ϭ 0.002). From this, one can propose that the amygdala has a specialized role in processing visually relevant emotional cues, signalling fear, aversiveness, or salience. Because of its projections to virtually all levels of visual processing in the occipital cortex, the amygdala is positioned to modulate visual input, based on emotional significance, at a variety of levels along this visual processing stream. Hence, as discussed earlier, the amygdalar activations may be primarily for processing affective information within the visual processing stream in service of imparting danger warnings (Davis and Whalen, 2001) . Similarly, others have suggested that the amygdalar response to visual emotionally stimuli may be in the serviced of assigning emotional significance to sensory, particularly visual, inputs (Simpson et al., 2000) or that because of its modulatory influences, the amygdala may facilitate processing of salient, adaptively significant visual inputs (Morris et al., 1998) . Given that humans rely on vision, more than hearing or olfaction, to evaluate changes in the environment, the amygdala is well positioned to alert us to visual threat following perception by the occipital cortex.
Interestingly, very few recall-driven emotion activation studies engaged the amygdala (at 7% frequency). Some authors have hypothesized that the amygdala is less engaged by recalled emotions than for visuallyevocative emotions (Reiman et al., 1997; Damasio et al., 2000) . Thus, the amygdala may be more responsible for processing of externally-cued perceptual emotional stimuli (Reiman et al., 1997; Teasdale 1999) , and less involved in internally generated recollection or imagery of those stimuli (Reiman et al., 1997; Whalen et al., 1998; Rauch et al., 1999; Shin et al., 2000; Damasio et al., 2000) . Another potential issue is that many memories recalled are likely to involve more than one emotion (George et al., 1995) , and thereby may reduce statistical power to detect subtle changes in the amygdalar response, which may also be selective for certain emotions. The relationship of self-generated emotion by recalling personal events in a controlled environment like a PET scanner is clearly phenomenologically different from the spontaneous and direct experience that emotion in a natural setting (Mayberg et al., 1997) . Another potential explanation of the infrequency of amygdala activation in emotional recall may be due to the temporal relationship between changes in blood flow and the behavior in question. Also, the induction of emotions by recall or imagery may be more time-consuming than more direct perceptual induction, making differences in amygdalar responses difficult to detect in PET studies due to limited temporal resolution, or the time-consuming process may be susceptible to known habituation effects (Breiter et al., 1996) .
CAVEATS AND LIMITATIONS OF REVIEW
Meta-analysis methodologies in general, and this review in particular, have a number of limitations worth discussing. First, in the search for potential associations between emotion and brain activation, authors may be biased in reporting certain activations. For example, because the associations between fear and the amygdala and between sadness and the subcallosal anterior cingulate cortex have gained attention in activation studies of emotion, studies may under-report failures to find the expected activations, and consequently inflate the probability of finding such associations in a meta-analysis. Second, there is substantial difficulty in examining results from non-uniform experiments. Emotion activation studies differ widely not only in the evocative stimulus, induction method, and emotional tasks employed but also in their statistical power, in the criteria used in defining significant results, and in methods of preprocessing imaging data. Such factors may affect the results considerably and add to the diverse activation patterns throughout the entire brain. Third, there are limitations of the subtraction method, which produced all the activation foci examined in this review. The subtraction method is limited because it does not identify all the regions that are involved in certain emotion/emotional task but only those that show a significant difference between the target and reference condition. Consequently, the re-sults are confounded if the process of interest is not successfully isolated (Jennings et al., 1997) .
Based on the distribution of all activation peaks represented in the brain renderings (Fig. 1) , one alternative interpretation is that emotional tasks involve multiple regions throughout the entire brain and do not conclusively point to any particular functional specialization, and that these regions are not disproportionately important to any one emotion. This interpretation would suggest that brain regions are not committed to specific emotions or induction method, but rather may be involved in a variety of emotional, cognitive-emotion, or nonemotional executive tasks. However, comparisons using frequency of activation (percentage of studies reporting) and chi-square analyses (Fig. 2) provide support the associations we have identified in this review. It should be reasonable to expect that significant results from separate independent studies would be reliable data. Nevertheless, we consider the associations identified in this meta-analysis as preliminary and would caution readers against premature conclusions about functional specialization.
We also acknowledge other limitations specific to this review. First, while we separated "Emotion Alone" tasks from those with "Cognitive Demand" in order to examine the effect of a cognitive "nonemotional" component on passive emotional responses, this classification can be argued as somewhat arbitrary. Some tasks labeled as "with Cognitive Demand" (e.g., gender identification) may be regarded as a noncognitively demanding. We would argue that when compared to passive emotional tasks (e.g., viewing emotional faces alone), such acts require that subjects make an overt discrimination/categorization and add a decision-making component, thereby rendering it more "cognitive" than passive viewing (even if the additional cognitive load may be small). However, the heterogeneity of cognitive tasks employed by different experiments should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. Second, we did not include imaging studies examining fear, aversive, and trace conditioning in this review, mainly because the acquisition and extinction tasks examined in these paradigms are not comparable to the other emotional tasks employed by the 55 studies included in our database. If included, there may have been additional evidence for the association between fear and the amygdala, which is supported by the findings of Bü chel and in their review of this literature. We acknowledge that the decision not to include findings from conditioning studies may have affected the results of this review. Finally, the limited representation of certain induction methods (e.g., auditory) and individual emotions (e.g., anger, disgust) lowers the statistical power to further detect functional anatomic specificity.
CONCLUSION
To our knowledge, this is the first meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging studies involving emotion. Using data obtained from a collection of studies, we examined if specific brain regions were associated with emotional activation in general, different emotions, different induction methods, and cognitive emotional tasks. Our meta-analysis yielded the following summary observations: (1) The medial prefrontal cortex appeared to have a general role in emotional processing across all categories and domains of interest; (2) fear specifically engaged the amygdala; (3) sadness was associated with activity in the subcallosal cingulate; (4) induction by visual stimuli activated the occipital cortex and the amygdala; (5) induction by emotional recall/imagery recruited the anterior cingulate and insula; (6) emotional tasks with cognitive demand particularly involved the anterior cingulate and insula. Our meta-analysis further delineates discrete brain regions that are involved in various emotional tasks. Many of these implicated areas and their putative functional roles are consistent with data previously provided from anatomic descriptions, animal experiments, and human lesion studies.
Several methodological approaches would potentially improve the reliability and validity of identifying specific brain regional involvement in emotion and the ability to make meaningful comparisons across studies in subsequent meta-analyses. Future studies could use more uniform, standard stimuli and design activation paradigms with careful exact isolation of the emotional process of interest. The effect of individual differences in brain activation could be examined by parametric or factorial designs (e.g., correlation with behavioral/ physiologic indices) or by personality and temperament measures. Specific activations could be further isolated through "conjunction" and "network" analyses or event-related designs (Cabeza and Nyberg, 2000) . Though future neuroimaging studies will no doubt add to our current understanding functional brain segregation and connectivity for emotional operations, the patterns and regions identified in this review are important constituents of the functional neuroanatomy of emotion.
